We propose a linearly homomorphic signature scheme that authenticates vector subspaces of a given ambient space. Our system has several novel properties not found in previous proposals:
Introduction
A linearly homomorphic signature scheme signs n-dimensional vectors v 1 , . . . , v k defined over some finite field F p and outputs one signature per vector. The linear homomorphic property is that given these k signatures, anyone can produce a signature on any vector v in the F p -linear span of v 1 , . . . , v k . The signature is secure if it is difficult to produce a signature on any vector v ∈ F n p outside the linear span of v 1 , . . . , v k . We give precise definitions in Section 2.
The original motivation for linearly homomorphic signatures comes from the network coding routing mechanism [16, 13, 31, 7, 17] . In a computer network that uses network coding, a message sender signs a number of "augmented" message vectors and transmits the resulting vector-signature pairs through the network to a recipient. Each router along the way receives a number of signed vectors and creates a random linear combination v of the vectors it receives. The router uses the homomorphic property to derive a signature on v and forwards v and its signature to the next router, which then does the same with the signed vectors it receives. The ultimate recipient obtains several random linear combinations of the original message vectors, discards all vectors that are not properly signed, and recovers the original message by solving a full-rank linear system over F p . Security of the signature scheme ensures that the recipient obtains the originally transmitted message vectors. In implementations there is a desire to use network coding with addition over F 2 , so that computations on messages are simple XORs and decoding amounts to solving a linear system over F 2 .
Beyond network coding, linearly homomorphic signatures enable linear computations on authenticated data. For example, consider a server that stores signed data samples s 1 , . . . , s n in F p . The signature on sample s i is actually a signature on the vector (s i |e i ) ∈ F n+1 p , where e i the ith unit vector in F n p . The server stores (i, s i ) and a signature on (s i |e i ). (The vector e i need not be stored with the data and can be reconstructed from i when needed.) Using the homomorphic property, the server can compute a signature σ on the sum ( n i=1 s i , 1, . . . , 1). If σ reveals no other information about the original samples, then the server can publish the sum n i=1 s i and the signature σ on the sum while maintaining privacy of the original data. The "augmentation" (1, . . . , 1) proves that the published message really is the claimed sum of the original samples. 1 More generally, the server can publish an authenticated inner product of the samples s := (s 1 , . . . , s n ) with any known vector c ∈ F n p without leaking additional information about the samples. This is needed, for example, to publish an authenticated Fourier coefficient from the Fourier transform of s. It can also be used to compute an authenticated least squares fit for a set of signed data.
Previous results on linearly homomorphic signatures make use of groups in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard [22, 13, 31, 7] or the RSA assumption holds [17] . In the former case, signatures are linearly homomorphic over F p for some large p, while in the latter case, signatures are homomorphic over the integers (with some bound on the size of the coefficients allowed in linear combinations). In particular, no previous scheme can support linear operations over a small field such as F 2 . This appears to be an inherent limitation of discrete log-type systems, since the discrete log problem is not hard in F 2 . A similar limitation prevents an RSA-based system over F 2 .
More distantly related to our work is the notion of "redactable" signatures [30, 20, 19, 6, 26, 25, 12, 10, 9] . These schemes have the property that given a signature on a message, anyone can derive a signature on subsets of the message. Our focus here is quite different -we look at linear operations on tuples of authenticated vectors rather than a subset operation on a single message.
Our contributions.
• Homomorphic signatures over F 2 : We construct the first unforgeable linearly homomorphic signature scheme that authenticates vectors with coordinates in F 2 . Our construction gives an example of a cryptographic primitive that can be built using lattice methods, but cannot currently be built using bilinear maps or other traditional algebraic methods based on factoring or discrete log type problems. Our scheme can be easily modified to authenticate vectors with coefficients in other small fields, including prime fields and extension fields such as F 2 d . In addition, our scheme is private, in the sense that a derived signature on a vector v leaks no information about the original signed vectors beyond what is revealed by v.
• A simple k-time signature without random oracles: We describe a stateless signature scheme and prove it secure in the standard model when used to sign at most k messages, for small values of k. The public key of our scheme is significantly smaller than that of any other stateless lattice-based signature scheme that can sign multiple large messages and is secure in the standard model. Our construction can be viewed as "removing the random oracle" from the signature scheme of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [18] , but only for signing k messages.
• New tools for lattice-based signatures: Unforgeability of both of our schemes is based on a new hard problem on lattices, which we call the k-Small Integer Solutions (k-SIS) problem. We show that k-SIS reduces to the standard Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem, which is known to be as hard as standard worst-case lattice problems [24] .
Unforgeability of our k-time signature scheme depends on bounds for the length of vectors sampled from discrete Gaussian distributions. We prove both upper and lower bounds that are essentially as tight as possible. Our upper bound improves on a result of Micciancio and Regev [24, Lemma 4.4] , and our lower bound is (to our knowledge) the first such bound in the literature.
Privacy of our linearly homomorphic scheme depends on a new result on discrete Gaussian distributions, namely, that the distribution of a sum of samples from a discrete Gaussian is statistically close to a discrete Gaussian distribution that depends only on the sum and not on the individual samples. While the analogous result for continuous Gaussians is well known, this is (to our knowledge) the first such result for discrete Gaussians.
Overview of the homomorphic signature scheme. Our construction builds on the signature scheme of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [18] , in which signatures are short vectors σ in lattices defined modulo some large integer q. The key idea in our construction is to use short vectors σ in (cosets of) lattices defined modulo 2q, which allows us to encode different information modulo 2 and modulo q: σ mod 2 encodes information about the vector being signed, while σ mod q encodes a solution to a hard problem, ensuring that an adversary cannot forge the signature. The fact that σ is a short integer vector ensures that the two parts cannot be attacked independently. Specifically, applying the Chinese remainder theorem to two vectors σ 2 and σ q that are correct mod 2 and mod q, respectively, does not produce a short integer vector. This property appears to be unique to latticebased cryptography: if we attempted a similar construction in discrete log groups of order 2q, we would easily be able to attack the order 2 and order q parts independently.
Concretely, our construction works as follows. Let q be an odd prime. To sign a vector subspace V = span(v 1 , . . . , v k ) of F n 2 , we define a matrix A V ∈ Z m×n 2q
and then sign each basis vector
2 is valid if σ has small norm and A V · σ = q · y mod 2q. Producing such a signature requires knowing a short basis for the integer lattice defined by the kernel of A V ; to obtain such a basis we combine the trapdoor generation algorithm of Alwen and Peikert [5] with the basis delegation mechanism of Cash, Hofheinz, Kiltz, and Peikert [11] .
The homomorphic property of our scheme is now immediate: if we are given arbitrary vector-signature pairs (v j , σ j ) ∈ F n 2 ×Z m for j = 1, . . . , , we can create a signature on v = v 1 +· · ·+v ∈ F n 2 by computing σ = σ 1 + · · · + σ ∈ Z m . Since the σ j are all valid signatures on the v j , we see that A V · σ = q · v mod 2q and σ has low norm (if is sufficiently small), so σ is a valid signature on v.
Security and the k-SIS problem. To prove unforgeability, we need to show that given signatures on basis vectors of V , it is impossible to generate a signature on a vector outside of V . To do so we define the k-SIS problem, which, roughly speaking, is as follows:
Given a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and k short vectors e 1 , . . . , e k ∈ Z m satisfying A · e i = 0 mod q, find a short vector e ∈ Z m satisfying A · e = 0 mod q, such that e is not in Q-span({e 1 , . . . , e k }).
When k = 0 this is the standard SIS problem [24] .
In Section 5 we show that an adversary that breaks the homomorphic signature scheme (defined mod 2q) in the random oracle model can be used to solve the k-SIS problem (defined mod q). In Section 4 we show that the k-SIS problem is as hard as the SIS problem. Our reduction degrades exponentially in k, which forces us to use a constant-size k if we want our linearly homomorphic scheme to be provably secure based on worst-case lattice problems. It is an important open problem to give either a tighter reduction to SIS or a direct reduction from k-SIS to worst-case lattice problems.
For some applications of linearly homomorphic signatures it is desirable that the derived signatures be private; that is, a derived signature on a vector v in span(v 1 , . . . , v k ) should not leak information about the original vectors v 1 , . . . , v k beyond what is revealed by v. For our construction, to prove privacy it suffices to show that the distribution obtained by summing independent discrete Gaussians depends only on the coset of the sum and the linear combination being computed. We prove this statement in Section 4.
Overview of the k-time signature scheme. Our goal is to use the same mechanism as in the homomorphic signature scheme to construct an ordinary signature scheme. Since homomorphic signatures are not existentially unforgeable, we must find a way to remove the homomorphic property. To do this, we impose the requirement that the length of a valid signature σ ∈ Z m be very close to the expected length of the vector produced by the signing algorithm. We then show that any linear combination of valid signatures will be too long to satisfy this tight bound, so the homomorphic property is of no use to an adversary.
As with the homomorphic scheme, the security of our k-time signature scheme follows from hardness of the k-SIS problem. We prove security (in the standard model) against a static attacker, who submits all of his message queries before receiving the public key. By a standard transformation using chameleon hashes [21] , this implies the existence of a scheme secure against an adaptive attacker, also in the standard model. Our security proof requires tight bounds on the length of a vector sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution. We use new upper and lower bounds that are essentially as tight as possible.
Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [23] give a lattice-based one-time signature scheme secure in the standard model and show how it can be converted to sign k messages. For small values of k, our construction gives a more efficient stateless k-time signature than is produced by this conversion.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 gives a formal definition and security model for linearly homomorphic signatures. In Section 3 we review facts about latticesthat we will use in our construction and security proof; additional facts can be found in Appendix A. Section 4 describes the k-SIS problem and gives our reduction of k-SIS to SIS. We also prove our new bounds on the length of vectors sampled from discrete Gaussians and our result about the distribution of sums of discrete Gaussian samples. In Section 5 we present our homomorphic scheme and prove its security, and in Section 6 we present our k-time signature scheme and prove its security. Finally, in Section 7 we describe extensions of our scheme to vector spaces over more general fields and pose some open problems.
Linearly Homomorphic Signatures
We define linearly homomorphic signatures over any principal ideal domain R. These signatures authenticate tuples (a.k.a. vectors) of elements of R. This definition encompasses the homomorphic signatures over finite fields defined by Boneh et al. [7] as well as the signatures over Z and Z N defined by Gennaro et al. [17] . While we describe the system in terms of a fixed ring R, it may be that R is determined by the Setup algorithm, as in the case where the size of R depends on the system's security parameter.
To prevent "mix-and-match" attacks, each set of vectors signed is given a unique identifier id, which serves to tie together all vectors that belong to the same file or data set. Our security model requires that this identifier be unpredictable; in our scheme it is chosen at random by the signer.
Definition 2.1 (adapted from [7] ). Let R be a principal ideal domain. A linearly homomorphic signature scheme over R is a tuple of probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms (Setup, Sign, Combine, Verify) with the following functionality:
• Setup(n, params). On input a security parameter n (in unary) and additional public parameters params that include the dimension N of the ambient space and the dimension k of subspaces to be signed, this algorithm outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
• Sign(sk, id, v). On input a secret key sk, an identifier id ∈ {0, 1} n , and a vector v ∈ R N , this algorithm outputs a signature σ.
• Combine(pk, id, {(α i , σ i )} i=1 ). On input a public key pk, an identifier id, and a set of tuples {(α i , σ i )} i=1 with α i ∈ R, this algorithm outputs a signature σ. (This σ is intended to be a signature on i=1 α i v i .)
• Verify(pk, id, y, σ). On input a public key pk, an identifier id ∈ {0, 1} n , a vector y ∈ R N , and a signature σ, this algorithm outputs either 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
We require that for each (pk, sk) output by Setup(n, params), we have:
1. For all id and y ∈ R N , if σ ← Sign(sk, id, y) then Verify(pk, id, y, σ) = 1.
2. For all id ∈ {0, 1} n and all sets of triples
In our lattice-based linearly homomorphic signature scheme, we cannot combine arbitrarily many valid signatures and still guarantee successful verification. We capture this property by saying that the scheme is L-limited if correctness property (2) holds for all ≤ L whenever the σ i are output by the Sign algorithm.
Unforgeability
The security model for linearly homomorphic signatures allows an adversary to make adaptive signature queries on files of his choosing, with the signer randomly choosing the identifier id for each file queried. The winning condition captures the fact that there are two distinct types of forgeries: a vector-signature pair (y * , σ * ) that verifies for some file not queried to the signer (a type 1 forgery), or a pair (y * , σ * ) that verifies for some file that was queried to the signer, but for which y * is not a linear combination of the vectors queried (a type 2 forgery). Definition 2.2 (adapted from [7] ). A homomorphic signature scheme S = (Setup, Sign, Combine, Verify) over R is unforgeable if the advantage of any probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary A in the following security game is negligible in the security parameter n:
Setup: The challenger runs Setup(n, params) to obtain (pk, sk), and gives pk to A.
Queries: Proceeding adaptively, A specifies a sequence of k-dimensional subspaces V i ⊂ R N , represented as a k-tuples of basis vectors v i1 , . . . , v ik . For each i, the challenger chooses id i uniformly from {0, 1} n and gives to A the identifier id i and the j signatures σ ij ← Sign(sk, id i , v ij ) for j = 1, . . . , k.
Output: A outputs id * ∈ {0, 1} n , a non-zero vector y * ∈ R N , and a signature σ * .
The adversary wins if Verify(pk, id * , y * , σ * ) = 1, and either (1) id * = id i for all i (a type 1 forgery), or (2) id * = id i for some i but y * ∈ V i (a type 2 forgery). The advantage HomSig-Adv[A, S] of A is defined to be the probability that A wins the game.
Privacy
Given signatures on vectors v 1 , . . . , v k in R N , it is desirable that derived signatures on a vector v in span(v 1 , . . . , v k ) not leak any information about v 1 , . . . , v k beyond what is revealed by v. We are not trying to hide the fact the derivation took place or the function that was used to compute v, merely the inputs to the function.
More precisely, we define privacy for linearly homomorphic signatures using a variation of a definition from [10] . The definition captures the idea that given signatures on a number of derived vectors in one of two different vector spaces, the attacker cannot tell which space the derived signatures came from. This indistinguishability holds even if the secret key is leaked. We call signatures with this property weakly context hiding. The reason for "weak" is that we are not hiding the fact that derivation took place or the computed function and we assume the original signatures are not public. Ahn et al. [3] define a stronger notion of privacy, called strong context hiding, that requires that derived signatures be distributed as independent fresh signatures on the same message; this requirement ensures privacy even if the original signatures are exposed. Definition 2.3. A homomorphic signature scheme S = (Setup, Sign, Combine, Verify) over R is weakly context hiding if the advantage of any probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary A in the following security game is negligible in the security parameter n:
Setup: The challenger runs Setup(n, params) to obtain (pk, sk) and gives pk and sk to A.
Challenge: A outputs (V 0 , V 1 , f 1 , . . . , f s ) where V 0 and V 1 are linear spaces over R N represented as k-tuples
In response, the challenger generates a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and a random tag τ ∈ {0, 1} n and signs the vector space V B using the tag τ . Next, for i = 1, . . . , s the challenger uses Combine to derive signatures
k ) and sends σ 1 , . . . , σ s to A. The functions f 1 , . . . , f s can be output adaptively after V 0 , V 1 are output.
Output: A outputs a bit b .
The adversary A wins the game if b = b . The advantage of A is the probability that A wins the game.
Winning the context hiding game game means that the attacker was able to determine whether the challenge signatures were derived from signatures on V 0 or from signatures on V 1 . We note that for discrete log-based linearly homomorphic signatures such as those of [7] , weak context hiding follows from the uniqueness of the signature.
We say that the signature is weak context hiding for a single signature if in the privacy game above the adversary can only obtain a single derived signature in the challenge phase (i.e. s = 1).
Background on Lattices
In this section we describe the lattices we will be using and their properties. Results from probability that we will need appear in Appendix A.
Notation. For any integer q ≥ 2, we let Z q denote the ring of integers modulo q. When q is prime, Z q is a field and is sometimes denoted F q . We let Z n×m q denote the set of n × m matrices with entries in Z q . We denote matrices by capital boldface letters and vectors by lowercase boldface letters. We say a function f : Z → R + is negligible if it is O(n −c ) for all c > 0, and we use negl(n) to denote a negligible function of n. The function lg x is the base 2 logarithm of x.
Lattices. An m-dimensional lattice Λ is a full-rank discrete subgroup of R m . We will be interested in integer lattices Λ, i.e., those whose points have coordinates in Z m . The lattices we consider consist of vectors either generated by or orthogonal to a certain "arity check" matrix modulo some integer q. More precisely, for any integer q ≥ 2 and any A ∈ Z n×m q , we define
The lattice Λ u q (A) is a coset of Λ ⊥ q (A); namely, Λ u q (A) = Λ ⊥ q (A) + t for any t such that A · t = u mod q.
2 If the scheme is L-limited, we require the fi to have at most L nonzero coefficients.
Length of a basis. Let S be an ordered set of linearly independent (column) vectors S = {s 1 , . . . , s k } in R m . We use the following standard notation:
• S denotes the length (using the 2 norm) of the longest vector in S, i.e. S := max i s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
• S := {s 1 , . . . ,s k } ⊂ R m denotes the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the vectors s 1 , . . . , s k taken in that order. We refer to S as the Gram-Schmidt norm of S.
Generating a short basis. The public key for our signature scheme will be a random matrix A, and the secret key will be a basis S for Λ ⊥ (A) with low Gram-Schmidt norm. We can generate A and S using an algorithm of Alwen and Peikert [5] , which improves on an algorithm of Ajtai [4] . Let q be an integer 3 and m := 6n lg q . There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm TrapGen(q, n) that outputs a pair (A ∈ Z n×m q , S ∈ Z m×m ) such that A is statistically close to a uniform matrix in Z n×m q and S is a basis for Λ ⊥ q A such that S ≤ 30 √ n lg q with all but negligible probability in n.
By Lemma A.3, we may assume without loss of generality that the matrix A generated by TrapGen has rank n.
Delegating a basis. In our signature scheme, the lattice used to sign a file will need to be derived from two sources: the public key, which is a matrix A generated using TrapGen, and the file identifier id, which is random. To combine the two, we hash the file identifier to a second matrix and derive a short basis for A H(id). To derive this new basis we use the delegation mechanism of Cash et al.'s identity-based encryption scheme [11] . Sampling from a discrete Gaussian. Gentry et al. [18] construct algorithms for sampling from discrete Gaussians. (a) [18, Theorem 4.1] There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm SampleGaussian that, given a basis T of an n-dimensional lattice Λ, a parameter σ ≥ T · ω( √ log n), and a center c ∈ R n , outputs a sample from a distribution that is statistically close to D Λ,σ,c .
(b) [18, Theorem 5.9] There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm SamplePre that, given a matrix
, and a vector u ∈ Z n , outputs a sample from a distribution that is statistically close to
. Algorithm SamplePre(A, T, u, σ) simply calls SampleGaussian(T, σ, −t) and adds t to the result. For Gaussians centered at the origin, we use SampleGaussian(T, σ) to denote SampleGaussian(T, σ, 0). We use the notation SampleGaussian(Z m , σ) to denote sampling from the lattice Z m with a basis consisting of the m unit vectors.
The smoothing parameter. For an n-dimensional lattice Λ and positive real > 0, the smoothing parameter η (Λ) of Λ is defined to be the smallest positive s such that ρ 1/s (Λ * \ {0}) ≤ [24] . The key property of the smoothing parameter is that if σ > η (Λ), then every coset of Λ has roughly equal mass. More precisely, for any such σ, if ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ R n , then we have [18, Lemma 2.7]
For almost all matrices A ∈ Z n×m q , there is a negligible such that the smoothing parameter η (Λ ⊥ q (A)) is less than ω( √ log m):
. Let q be a prime and n, m integers such that m > 2n lg q. Let f be some ω( √ log m) function. Then there is a negligible function (m) such that for all but at most a q −n fraction of
Hardness assumption. The security of our signature schemes is based on the problem of finding short vectors in Λ ⊥ q (A) for random A. This is known as the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem, and is defined as follows. 
If B is an algorithm that takes as input a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , we define SIS-Adv[B, (q, m, β)] to be the probability that B outputs a solution to a uniformly random SIS q,m,β problem instance A. [24] and Gentry et al. [18] show that the (average case) SIS problem for β = poly(n) is hard assuming worst-case hardness of certain standard approximation problems on lattices, such as the shortest independent vector problem SIVP and the shortest vector problem GapSVP.
Micciancio and Regev

New Tools
A "One-More" SIS Problem
The security of most lattice-based signature schemes depends on the adversary's inability to find a short vector in Λ ⊥ q (A) for some public matrix A. However, for our linearly homomorphic signatures this criterion is insufficient. Roughly speaking, an adversary in our scheme will be given several short vectors e 1 , . . . , e k ∈ Λ ⊥ q (A) and must produce a short vector in Λ ⊥ q (A) that is not in the span of the e i . This is a "one-more" variant of the standard SIS problem, analogous to the "one-more discrete logarithm" problem in group-based cryptography (see e.g., [27] ). We will see in Section 4.3 that for certain choices of parameters the problem is equivalent to finding any short vector in Λ ⊥ q (A) distinct from {±e i }, making the "one-more" analogy even more appropriate. We now formally define the problem.
Definition 4.1. For any integer k ≥ 0, an instance of the k-SIS q,m,β,σ problem is a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a set of k vectors e 1 , . . . , e k ∈ Λ ⊥ q (A). A solution to the problem is a nonzero vector v ∈ Z m such that
If B is an algorithm that takes as input a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and vectors e i ∈ Z m for i = 1, . . . , k, we define k-SIS-Adv[B, (q, m, β, σ)] to be the probability that B outputs a solution to a k-SIS q,m,β,σ problem instance (A, e 1 , . . . , e k ) over uniformly random A in Z n×m q and e i drawn from the distribution D Λ ⊥ q (A),σ . When k = 0 the k-SIS problem is identical to the SIS problem. The main result of this section is to show that an adversary A that solves the k-SIS problem in dimension m can be used to solve the SIS problem in dimension m − k. More precisely, we have the following: Theorem 4.2. Let q be a prime, and let m, β, σ, and k, be polynomial functions of a security parameter n.
Then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm B that solves SIS q,m−k,β , such that
Since the SIS problem is only assumed to be hard for parameters β = poly(n), the fact that the above reduction degrades exponentially in k means that k must be chosen to be small enough so that β is still polynomial in n. In our application the parameter σ is ω( √ n), which means that k must be chosen to be O(1). In this case, if we take t = O(log σ) and β = β · O(σ k log k σ), then Theorem 4.2 shows that if the SIS q,m−k,β problem is hard, then the k-SIS q,m,β,σ problem is also hard.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 4.2 is as follows: given an SIS challenge A ∈ Z n×(m−k) q , we can choose k random vectors e i from a Gaussian distribution over Z m and append k columns to A to create a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q such that the e i are in Λ ⊥ q (A). If the k-SIS adversary A outputs a short vector e * ∈ Λ ⊥ q (A) that is Q-linearly independent of the {e i }, then we can use Gaussian elimination over Z (via Cramer's rule) to compute a short vector v ∈ Λ ⊥ q (A) with zeroes in the last k entries. Reading off the first m − k entries of v gives us a short vector in Λ ⊥ q (A ). To turn this idea into a formal proof, we need to show that the tuple (A, e 1 , . . . , e k ) generated in this manner is indistinguishable from a tuple (A, e 1 , . . . , e k ) selected from the distribution of k-SIS challenge instances. To show this, we define two distributions on Z n×m q × Z m×k .
For positive integers m > n > k, a prime q, and a real σ > 2, define DIST 0 (n, m, k, q, σ) as:
Choose a random A ∈ Z n×m q subject to the condition A · e i = 0 mod q for all i.
Define DIST 1 (n, m, k, q, σ) as:
To prove Theorem 4.2, we will use the fact that for appropriate choices of parameters, the distributions DIST 0 and DIST 1 are statistically close. Theorem 4.3. Suppose m ≥ 2n lg q, m > 2k, and σ > ω( √ log m). Then the distributions DIST 0 (n, m, k, q, σ) and DIST 1 (n, m, k, q, σ) are statistically close.
Before proving this theorem, we need several preparatory lemmas. 
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, there is a negligible (n) such that σ > η (Λ ⊥ q (A)) for all but a q −n fraction of A ∈ Z n×m q . By (3.1), for all such A and all c ∈ R n , we have
If rank(A) = n, then [Z m : Λ ⊥ q (A)] = q n and the result follows. Since m > 2n, the fraction of matrices A ∈ Z n×m q with rank(A) < n is negligible (cf. Lemma A.3).
Lemma 4.5. Suppose m ≥ 2n lg q, m > 2k, σ > ω( √ log m), and q > σ · ω( √ log m) with q prime. Let A ∈ Z n×m q be a matrix satisfying the conclusion of Lemma 4.4. Let e 1 , . . . , e k be vectors sampled from D Λ ⊥ q (A),σ . Then with overwhelming probability, the set {e i } has Z q -rank k.
Proof. For i = 1, . . . , m, let E i ∈ Z i×m q be the matrix whose rows are the vectors e j mod q for j = 1, . . . , i. Then the probability that e 1 , . . . , e k are not Z q -linearly independent is at most
. Using this result and Lemma 4.4, we see that the quantity (4.1) is bounded above by
By [1, Lemma 21] and the assumption σ > ω( √ log m), there is a constant δ > 0 such that for all i, we have
Thus the quantity (4.2) is bounded above by
for some constant δ . Since m ≥ 2n lg q and k < m/2, this last quantity is less than δ · q −n whenever σ > 4.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We compute the statistical distance directly. First we note that if the vectors {e i } chosen in DIST 0 have Z q -rank , then there are q n(m− ) possible choices for A, with each choice equally likely. We thus see that
On the other hand, a sample from DIST 1 is nm independent uniform samples from Z q and k independent samples from D Λ ⊥ q (A),σ , and thus
.
Let S ⊂ Z n×m q be the set of matrices for which the conclusion of Lemma 4.4 holds, and for any
We first calculate the distance between DIST 0 and DIST 1 when restricted to those tuples for which A ∈ S and {e i } ∈ T A :
Then by Lemma 4.4, we have
If we relax the restriction on the rank of the {e i }, then the total sum does not decrease, and the numerator of the last sum now includes all terms of the form
) k contains all of these terms and more, we have
By Lemma 4.4 and since |S| ≤ q nm , we conclude that ∆ 0 ≤ negl(n).
Next, we claim that
Given this claim, the theorem now follows from statement (2) of Lemma A.1, choosing the set A of the Lemma to be tuples with A ∈ S and {e i } ∈ T A and using the fact that ∆ 0 ≤ negl(n).
To show (4.4), it suffices to show that both Pr[A ∈ S] and Pr[A ∈ S and {e i } ∈ T A ] are both negligible for tuples chosen from DIST 1 . The first quantity is negligible because all matrices A are equally likely to be chosen, and by Lemma 4.4 a negligible fraction of all matrices are not in S. The second quantity is negligible by Lemma 4.5.
We can now prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let A be an algorithm that takes as input a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and k vectors e 1 , . . . , e k ∈ Z m and outputs a vector e ∈ Z m . We construct an algorithm B that takes as input a matrix B ∈ Z n×(m−k) q and outputs a vector w ∈ Z m−k q . At a high level, algorithm B begins by sampling k vectors e i at random from a Gaussian over Z m . It then uses the SIS challenge B to create a random matrix A such that A · e i = 0 mod q for all i. By Theorem 4.3, the tuple (A, e 1 , . . . , e k ) created in this manner is statistically indistinguishable from a k-SIS challenge. Algorithm B can thus use the k-SIS solver A to find a short vector e ∈ Λ ⊥ q (A) and do Gaussian elimination over Z to find a vector in Λ ⊥ q (A) whose last k entries are zero. On a technical level, algorithm B works as follows:
2. Let E be the m × k matrix whose columns are the vectors e i . If E has Z q -rank less than k, then abort (the simulation has failed). If the simulation does not fail, then without loss of generality 4 assume that the last k rows of E are linearly independent mod q.
, where F ∈ Z (m−k)×k , and G ∈ Z k×k has determinant prime to q.
6. Run A on inputs A, e 1 , . . . , e k , and let e ∈ Z m be the output.
7. Write e = f g with f ∈ Z m−k and g ∈ Z k .
We begin by observing that the selection of the e i in Step (1) can be viewed as choosing m vectors from SampleGaussian(Z k , σ). If we partition these m vectors into m/k sets of k vectors (plus some extras), then by [1, Theorem 30 ] the probability that any one of these sets has Z q -rank less than k is bounded above by some constant δ < 1. Thus the probability that the matrix E has rank less than k is bounded above by δ m/k , which is negligible in n since m/k ≥ n. It follows that the probability that B aborts in Step (2) is negligible.
Since E has rank k with overwhelming probability, the distribution (A, e 1 , . . . , e k ) produced by the simulator is statistically close to DIST 0 (n, m, k, q, σ). By Theorem 4.3, this distribution is statistically close to that of (A, e 1 , . . . , e k ) in a k-SIS challenge. Thus even a computationally unbounded adversary cannot tell if it is interacting with a real k-SIS challenge or with our simulation, except with negligible probability.
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that w is a solution to the SIS problem for B; namely, that (a) w is nonzero, (b) B · w = 0 mod q, and (c) w ≤ β .
To show (a), first observe that w = 0 if and only if
. If w = 0, then f = F · y and g = G · y, and therefore E · y = e. Thus e is a Q-linear combination of the vectors e 1 , . . . , e k , contradicting the fact that e is a solution the k-SIS challenge.
To show (b), observe that since e = f g is a solution to the k-SIS challenge, we have A·e = B·f +U·g = 0 mod q. The construction of U then implies that
Finally, we bound the length of w. By a standard tail inequality [18, Lemma 4.2] , the absolute value of each entry of E is less than tσ with overwhelming probability. Furthermore, since e ≤ β we know that each entry of e has absolute value bounded by β. Since G · x = det(G)
We conclude that w ≤ β · (k 3/2 + 1)k!(tσ) k with overwhelming probability.
Our linearly homomorphic signature scheme will rely on properties of the signature vectors mod 2. We will need the following result, which shows that for small and appropriate choices of parameters, a sample from D Λ ⊥ q (A),σ looks uniformly random mod . Proposition 4.6. Let q and be relatively prime integers, let m > 2n lg q, and let σ > · ω( √ log m). Suppose (A, e 1 , . . . , e k ) ∈ Z n×m q × Z m×k is a tuple selected from the distribution of k-SIS q,m,β,σ challenge instances (for any β). Then the distribution of (A, e 1 mod , . . . , e k mod ) ∈ Z n×m q × Z m×k is statistically close to the uniform distribution on Z n×m
. To see this, observe that Λ (A) is contained in both Λ ⊥ q (A) and ( Z) m , and Λ ⊥ q (A) is contained in Λ (A). Let r = rank(A); then det(Λ ⊥ q (A)) = q r . It follows that q r | det(Λ (A)) and m | det(Λ (A)), and det(Λ (A)) | m q r . Since q and are relatively prime, we conclude that det(Λ (A)) = m q , and the claim follows.
Since
. By Lemma 3.4, there is a negligible (n) such that for all but at most a q −n fraction of A ∈ Z n×m q we have σ > η (Λ ⊥ q (A)). By [18, Corollary 2.8], for all such A the distribution of the e i is statistically close to uniform over
, and the proposition follows for all A satisfying the bound η (Λ ⊥ q (A)) < σ. Since all matrices A are equally likely and all but a q −n fraction satisfy this bound, the proposition follows.
Tight Bounds on the Length of Gaussian Samples
Signatures in our schemes will be "short" vectors sampled from Gaussian distributions over cosets of a particular lattice. Signatures will be accepted as valid if and only if they are sufficiently short and satisfy some congruence condition. To quantify what "short" means, we must demonstrate an upper bound on the length of a vector sampled from a Gaussian.
Micciancio and Regev [24, Lemma 4.4] show that if σ is larger than the smoothing parameter of the n-dimensional lattice Λ, then with overwhelming probability the length of a vector sampled from D Λ,σ,c is at most σ √ n. They also show that the expected length of such a sample is at most σ n/2π + negl(n). Our result below "bridges the gap" between the upper bound and the expected length. Furthermore, we show an equally strong lower bound on the length of the Gaussian sample. Proposition 4.7. Let Λ ⊂ R n be a lattice. Suppose σ ≥ η (Λ) for some negligible . Let c ∈ R m be any vector. Then for any constant α > 0 we have
Proof
If we apply (4.5) tox ≈ x + y sampled from D τ,c and tox = y sampled from D δσ,0 , then the triangle inequality implies that with overwhelming probability we have
The lemma now follows by choosing δ sufficiently close to 0 and γ 1 , γ 2 sufficiently close to 1 so that
Removing Linear Independence from the k-SIS Problem
We now show that for small values of k and tight length bounds, we can relax the linear independence condition in the statement of the k-SIS problem. Specifically, if we can find any nonzero vector e * of the required length not equal to ±e i for any of the k vectors e i in the problem statement, then with overwhelming probability e * is not in the linear span of the e i . Our main result is that if we sample about k < n 1/4 short vectors e i from a Gaussian distribution on a lattice, then the probability that there is an additional short vector in the k-dimensional sublattice spanned by the e i is negligible. Proposition 4.8. Let Λ ⊂ Z n be a lattice. Suppose σ ≥ η (Λ) for some negligible . Suppose k = k(n) satisfies 2k · ω(log 1/4 n) < n 1/4 . Let S = {e 1 , . . . , e k } be chosen from D Λ,σ . Then with overwhelming probability, the only nonzero vectors of length at most 1.1 · σ n/2π in Z-span(S) are the vectors ±e i for i = 1, . . . , k.
Before proving Proposition 4.8 we first state a simple corollary of Lemma 5.1 from [28] .
Lemma 4.9. Let Λ ⊂ Z n be a lattice and v ∈ R n a vector of norm 1. Then for σ > 0 and e sampled from D Λ,σ , the inner product v, e satisfies Pr v, e > σr < 2e −πr 2 .
In particular, Pr v, e > σ · ω( log n) < negl(n) Proof of Proposition 4.8. By Proposition 4.7 and Lemma 4.9, we know that with overwhelming probability
Now, let e be a nonzero vector in Z-span({e 1 , . . . , e k }), namely e = k i=1 c i e i for some c i ∈ Z. Then
Let c := (c 1 , . . . , c k ) and define c ∞ = max({|c i |} k i=1 ). Then by (4.6) and since k 2 √ n·ω(log 1/2 n) < n/4 we have
Similarly, by Proposition 4.7 we know that with overwhelming probability
Plugging the last two bounds into (4.7) we obtain
Now, if c ∈ Z k has more than one non-zero coordinate, then the quantity 0.9 c 2 − 0.3 c 2 ∞ is greater than 1.21 (the minimum case is the vector (1, 1, 0 , . . . , 0), for which the difference is 1.5). Therefore, if c has more than one non-zero coordinate the vector e is longer than 1.1 · σ n/2π. Finally, if e has one non-zero coordinate, then by Proposition 4.7 that coordinate must be 1 or −1 if e is to have length at most σ n/2π.
While Proposition 4.8 shows that there is no additional short vector in the integer span of k short vectors sampled from a Gaussian, a short integer vector that is in the rational span of the given vectors is also a valid solution to the k-SIS problem. The following lemma shows that with overwhelming probability, there is no such vector that is not already in the Z-span. Lemma 4.10. Suppose σ > k·f (n) and k < n/f (n) 2 for some ω( √ log n) function f . Let S = {e 1 , . . . , e k } be chosen from (D Z n ,σ ) k . Then with overwhelming probability we have Z n ∩ Q-span(S) = Z-span(S).
Proof. Suppose there is an integer vector v in the Q-span of S but not in the Z-span of S. Then there is a prime p such that the set {e i mod p} is linearly dependent over F p , so it suffices to show that for all primes p, the set S is linearly independent mod p with overwhelming probability.
First note that the set S is determined by nk independent samples from the one-dimensional Gaussian D Z,σ . For a given a ∈ Z, the probability that a sample from D Z,σ is congruent to a mod p is
, which is close to 1/p. Since σ > ω( √ log n), if n is sufficiently large, then this probability is less than 1/2k for all p > 2k.
Now let E be the matrix whose rows are the vectors e i . Suppose p > 2k and consider a k × k submatrix of E. Pick an entry of this matrix and assume that the determinant of the associated (k − 1) × (k − 1) minor is nonzero mod p. Then there is a unique value a mod p of the remaining entry that makes the determinant of the k × k submatrix zero mod p. By our analysis above, the probability that this value is a mod p is at most 1/2k. Applying the same argument inductively to the (k − 1) × (k − 1) minor along with a union bound, we see that the probability that the determinant is zero mod p is at most 1/2. Since there are n/k = ω(log n) independent k × k submatrices of E and all must have determinant zero mod p if S is linearly dependent mod p, the probability that S is linearly dependent mod p is negligible in n.
Finally, suppose p ≤ 2k. Since σ > p · ω( √ log n), it follows from [18, Corollary 2.8] that the distribution of e i mod pZ n is statistically close to uniform. Thus by Lemma A.3, the probability that E has rank less than k is at most 1/p n−k + negl(n), which is negligible in n.
Corollary 4.11. Suppose m ≥ 2n lg q and k · ω( √ log n) < min(σ, m 1/4 ). Let (A, e 1 , . . . , e k ) be a k-SIS challenge with A chosen uniformly at random from Z n×m q and e i sampled from D Λ ⊥ q (A),σ . Then with overwhelming probability, the only nonzero vectors of length at most 1.1 · σ m/2π in Q-span(e 1 , . . . , e k ) are the vectors ±e i for i = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. Let S = {e 1 , . . . , e k }. By Lemma 3.4, we have σ > η (Λ ⊥ q (A)) for negligible with overwhelming probability. Since k is constant, it follows from Proposition 4.8 that the only nonzero vectors of length at most 1.1 · σ m/2π in Z-span(S) are the vectors ±e i for i = 1, . . . , k. By Theorem 4.3, it is equivalent (up to negligible statistical distance) to choose e i ← D Z m ,σ and then choose random A ∈ Z n×m q such that A · e i = 0 mod q for all i. It now follows from Lemma 4.10 that with overwhelming probability there are no vectors in Q-span(S) that are not already in Z-span(S).
Linear Combinations of Discrete Gaussians
The privacy property of our linearly homomorphic scheme will follow from the fact that the distribution obtained by summing independent discrete Gaussian samples is itself a discrete Gaussian distribution that depends only on the coset of the sum and the linear combination being computed. We first prove this statement for a sum of two vectors; the more general statement follows by induction. Lemma 4.12. Let Λ 1 , Λ 2 ⊂ R m be two lattices and σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ R. Let X and Y be independent random variables distributed as D Λ 1 +t 1 ,σ 1 and D Λ 2 +t 2 ,σ 2 respectively. Define
and suppose that τ > η (Λ 1 ∩ Λ 2 ) for some negligible . Then the random variable Z := X + Y is sampled from a distribution statistically close to
Proof. Let z be some vector in (Λ 1 + t 1 ) + (Λ 2 + t 2 ). This means that there are t 1 ∈ Λ 1 + t 1 and t 2 ∈ Λ 2 + t 2 such that t 1 + t 2 = z. Now, the set
consists of all pairs of vectors in Z m that sum up to z where the first element is in Λ 1 + t 1 and the second element is in Λ 2 + t 2 . Therefore, setting Λ := Λ 1 ∩ Λ 2 and w := ρ σ 1 (Λ 1 + t 1 ) −1 ρ σ 2 (Λ 2 + t 2 ) −1 we obtain:
where τ is defined in the statement of the lemma. Now, using equation (3.1) we obtain that for all z in (Λ 1 + t 1 ) + (Λ 2 + t 2 ):
] and a scalar w := w · ρ τ (Λ) that is independent of z. Since is negligible it follows from Lemma A.2 that Z is statistically close to
Theorem 4.13. Let Λ ⊆ Z m be a lattice and σ ∈ R. For i = 1, . . . , k let t i ∈ Z m and let X i be mutually independent random variables sampled from D Λ+t i ,σ . Let c = (c 1 , . . . , c k ) ∈ Z k , and define
Proof. We induct on k. Without loss of generality, we may assume that all of the c i are nonzero. The case k = 1 follows from the fact that multiplying a sample from D Λ+t 1 ,σ by c 1 ∈ Z is the same as sampling from D c 1 Λ+c 1 t 1 ,|c 1 |σ . Now suppose the theorem holds for k − 1. Define
Since c ≤ c , we may apply the inductive hypothesis to conclude that the distribution of X is statistically close to
where the last inequality follows from the fact that g Λ ∩ c k Λ = hΛ with h = lcm(g , c k ) = |c k | · g /g ≤ |c k | · c . We may thus apply Lemma 4.12 to conclude that Z = X + Y is statistically close to
Multivariate discrete Gaussians. We generalize Theorem 4.13 to multivariate distributions. Let Λ ⊆ Z m be an m-dimensional lattice and for i = 1, . . . , k let x i be a mutually independent random variables distributed as D Λ+t i ,σ where t i ∈ Z m . Let X be the k × m matrix whose rows are x T 1 , . . . , x T k and let T be the k × m matrix whose rows are t T 1 , . . . , t T k . We show that for any matrix A ∈ Z s×k and sufficiently large σ the random variable Z := AX is statistically close to a distribution parametrized by Λ, σ, A, and AT . That is, the dependence on the matrix T is only via the quantity AT . Consequently, if X 1 and X 2 are random variables defined as X above, but using matrices T 1 and T 2 respectively, then AX 1 is statistically close to AX 2 whenever AT 1 = AT 2 . Theorem 4.13 is a special case where s = 1.
We first define parameters that determine how large σ needs to be. For a matrix A ∈ Z s×k of rank s,
If A has rank less than s then to define µ(A) we first define a matrixĀ as follows: scan the rows of A from first to last adding a row toĀ only if it is linearly independent of the rows already inĀ. ThenĀ is a maximal subset of linearly independent rows of A, and we define µ(A) := µ(Ā).
Theorem 4.14. Let Λ be an m-dimensional lattice, A ∈ Z s×k and T ∈ Z k×m . Let X be a k × m random matrix whose rows are mutually independent and whose ith row is distributed as D Λ+t i ,σ where t i is the ith row of T . Furthermore, suppose that σ > µ(A) η (Λ) for some negligible .
Then the random variable AX is statistically close to a distribution parametrized by Λ, σ, A, and AT .
Our proof of Theorem 4.14, given in Appendix B, describes explicitly the distribution of AX.
A Linearly Homomorphic Signature Scheme over F 2
We now describe our linearly homomorphic signature scheme over F 2 . Our construction is inspired by the signature scheme of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [18] . In the GPV scheme, signatures are short vectors in Λ u q (A), where u is the hash of the message to be signed. The key idea in our construction of homomorphic signatures is to work simultaneously modulo 2 and modulo an odd prime q. Specifically, a signature on a vector v ∈ F n 2 is a short vector e ∈ Z m such that e is in both Λ ⊥ q (A) and Λ v 2 (A). The mod 2 part ties the signature to the message, while the mod q part ensures that the signature cannot be forged. By the Chinese remainder theorem, such a vector e is in the lattice Λ q·v 2q (A). In order to be able to sign multiple files, the matrix A must be different for every file, yet still have a trapdoor that allows us to generate signatures using the SamplePre algorithm. To achieve this, we divide A into two parts. The left half is a public matrix generated by the TrapGen algorithm; the right half depends on the identifier of the file being signed. Given the secret basis output by TrapGen, we can use the ExtBasis algorithm to compute a short basis for Λ ⊥ 2q (A). Our scheme is as follows:
Setup(n, params). Given a security parameter n and parameters params = (N, k, L, m, q, σ), where N = n is the dimension of vectors to be signed, k < n is the dimension of subspaces to be signed, L ≥ 1 is the maximum number of linear combinations that can be authenticated, m(n, L) > n is an integer, q(n, L) is an odd prime, and σ(n, L) is a real number, do the following:
1. Run TrapGen(n, m, 2q) to generate a matrix A ∈ Z n×m 2q and a basis T of Λ ⊥ 2q (A) such that T ≤ 30 √ n lg 2q.
Let
be a hash function, viewed as a random oracle.
3. Output the public key pk ← (A, H), and the private key sk ← (A, H, T).
Sign(sk, id, v). Given secret key sk = (A, H, T), identifier id ∈ {0, 1} n , and a vector v ∈ F n 2 , do the following:
2. Let S ← ExtBasis(T, B) be a basis for Λ ⊥ 2q (B) with S = T . 3. Output e ← SamplePre(B, S, σ, q · v).
Combine(pk, id, {(α i , e i )} i=1 ). Given a public key pk, an identifier id, and pairs {(α i , e i )} i=1 with α i ∈
Verify(pk, id, y, e). Given a public key pk = (A, H), an identifier id, a signature e ∈ Z 2m , and a vector y ∈ F n 2 , do the following:
and (b) B · e = q · y mod 2q, output 1. Otherwise output 0.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose σ ≥ 30 √ n lg 2q · ω( √ log n). Then the scheme described above is an L-limited linearly homomorphic signature scheme over F 2 .
Proof. We must show that the correctness conditions of Definition 2.1 hold, with (2) holding for all ≤ L and σ i produced by the Sign algorithm. By Theorem 3.3 (b), the vector e output by the Sign algorithm satisfies B · e = q · v mod 2q and is drawn from a distribution statistically close to D Λ q·v 2q (B),σ . By Lemma 3.4 we have σ > η (Λ ⊥ 2q (B)) for negligible with overwhelming probability, so by Proposition 4.7 (with α = 1), we have e ≤ σ √ 2m with overwhelming probability. It follows that if e is output by Sign(sk, id, v), then Verify(pk, id, v, e) = 1.
Since the coefficients α i of linear combinations of messages are in {0, 1}, the length of the vector e output by Combine(pk, id, {(α i , e i )} i=1 ) when given signatures e i output by Sign is at most σ √ 2m, so this vector passes verification test (a) whenever ≤ L. As for verification test (b), suppose we have vectors v i such that Verify(pk, id, v i , e i ) = 1 for all i. Since q is odd, this implies that B · e i = 0 mod q and B · e i = v i mod 2 for all i. It follows that B · e = 0 mod q and B · e = α i v i mod 2, and therefore B · e = q · α i v i mod 2q.
Unforgeability
We prove unforgeability of our linearly homomorphic signature scheme over F 2 in the random oracle model. Given an adversary that breaks the signature scheme over Z 2q , we construct an adversary that simulates the signature scheme and the hash function H and solves the k-SIS problem over Z q . By Theorem 4.2, this adversary can in turn be used to solve the SIS problem over Z q .
Our simulation begins by guessing which of the adversary's signature and hash queries will correspond to the file identifier id * associated with the adversary's forgery and outputting a public key A derived from the k-SIS challenge matrix. For queries not associated with id * , the simulator "swaps the roles" of the public key and hash function as follows: we use TrapGen to program the random oracle with a matrix H(id) for which we know a short basis, and we use ExtBasis to compute a short basis for A H(id). We can then compute the signatures as in the real system.
For the query id * , we construct H(id * ) so that the k-SIS challenge vectors are valid signatures for the vectors queried by the adversary. We construct the mod q part of H(id * ) using the fact that valid signatures are elements of Λ ⊥ q (A H(id * )), and we construct the mod 2 part of H(id * ) using the fact that the k-SIS challenge vectors are statistically close to random mod 2.
With this setup, a forged signature is exactly a solution to the k-SIS problem mod q. We now give the theorem Theorem 5.2. Let N be the linearly homomorphic signature scheme over F 2 described above. Suppose that m = 6n lg 2q and σ = 30 √ n lg 2q log n. Let β = L · σ √ 2m. Then N is unforgeable in the random oracle model assuming that k-SIS q,2m,β,σ is infeasible.
In particular, let A be a polynomial-time adversary as in Definition 2.2. Then there exists a polynomialtime algorithm B that solves k-SIS q,2m,β,σ , such that
where Q s and Q h are the number of signature and hash queries made by A, respectively.
Proof. Let A be an adversary as in Definition 2.2 that makes at most Q s signature queries and at most Q h hash queries. We construct an algorithm B that takes as input a random matrix B ∈ Z n×2m q and k vectors e * 1 , . . . , e * k ← D Λ ⊥ q (B),σ , and outputs a short vector e * ∈ Z 2m that is Q-linearly independent of the e * i . Algorithm B simulates the hash function H and the Setup and Sign algorithms of N as follows:
Setup. B does the following:
2. Let A q be the left m columns of B.
3. Use the Chinese remainder theorem to compute A ∈ Z n×m 2q such that A = A 2 mod 2 and A = A q mod q.
Choose random
J R ← {1, . . . , Q s + Q h + 1}.
Output the public key A.
Hash query. When A requests the value of H(id), algorithm B does the following:
1. If id has already been queried, return H(id).
If id is the Jth hash query, do the following:
(a) Let E be the 2m × k matrix whose columns are the vectors e * i . If the last m rows of E have F 2 -rank less than k, then abort. (The simulation has failed.) (b) If id was chosen by the simulator to answer a signature query, do the following:
i. Let v 1 , . . . , v k be the vectors queried by the adversary, and let V be the n × k matrix whose columns are the vectors v i . ii. Choose a random matrix U 2 ← F n×m 2 such that (A 2 U 2 ) · E = V mod 2. such that U id = U q mod q and
3. Otherwise, do the following:
(a) Run TrapGen(n, m, 2q) to generate a matrix U id ∈ Z n×m 2q and a short basis
Sign. When A requests a signature on a file V represented by k vectors v 1 , . . . , v k ∈ F n 2 , algorithm B does the following:
1. Choose a random id R ← {0, 1} n . If id has already been queried to the hash function H, then abort. (The simulation has failed.)
Simulate a query to H(id). If this query is the
Output. Eventually A outputs a signature e * ∈ Z 2m , an identifier id * , and a nonzero vector y * ∈ F n 2 . Algorithm B outputs e * .
We first analyze the situations where the simulator can abort without outputting an answer and show that the probability that this happens is negligible, assuming Q s and Q h are polynomial in n.
• Step (2a) of hashing. By Proposition 4.6, the entries of E are statistically close to uniformly random mod 2. It follows from Lemma A.3 that the probability that the last m rows of E have F 2 -rank less than k is bounded above by 1/2 m−k + negl(n).
• Step (1) of signing. In this case, the simulator aborts if the identifier chosen for the signature query is the same as an identifier previously queried to the hash oracle. This happens with probability at most
Next, we observe that if the simulator does not abort, the distribution of the simulator's outputs is (statistically) indistinguishable from the distribution of the outputs in the real signature scheme, under the assumption that H is a random oracle.
• The public key. The matrix A in the simulation is uniformly random in Z n×m 2q . By Theorem 3.1, the matrix A in the real system is statistically close to uniform.
• The output of H (on most queries). If id is not the Jth hash query, then by Theorem 3.1, the matrices U id output by all other hash queries are statistically close to uniform. We defer the remaining case.
• The output of Sign (on most queries). If id is not the Jth hash query, then Theorem 3.3 (b) shows that the e i in both the real construction and the simulation come from a distribution that is statistically close to D Λ q·v i 2q (B),σ . We have shown above that the matrices B = A H(id) in the real scheme and simulation come from statistically close distributions. It follows that the output distributions of the signatures are statistically close.
• The output of H and Sign when id is the Jth hash query. By Proposition 4.6, the entries of the vectors e * i are statistically close to uniform mod 2. It follows that U 2 is statistically close to uniform mod 2 given the adversary's view, and therefore H(id) is uniformly random in Z n×m 2q . As for the signature, observe that the vectors e * i come from the distribution
2q (A U id ),σ , which by Theorem 3.3 (b) is statistically close to the distribution of signatures output by the real system. Now the probability that the simulator "guesses right"; i.e., that that id * is the Jth query to the hash function, is at least 1/(Q s + Q h + 1). If the simulator guesses right, then e * is a valid signature for the nonzero vector y * belonging to the file with identifier id * . In particular, this implies that e * is nonzero and e * < β. Furthermore, our construction implies that (A U id * ) · e * = q · y * mod 2q, and therefore e * is a nonzero vector in
. It remains to show that e * is not a Q-linear combination of the vectors e * i . Suppose the contrary; then e * = k i=1 c i e * i for some c i ∈ Q. We claim that with overwhelming probability, the c i all have odd denominator when written in lowest terms. To see this, let d be the least common denominator of the c i . If some c i has even denominator, then when we clear denominators we obtain an equation
where d is even and at least one of the c i ∈ Z is odd. Reducing mod 2, we see that this implies that the e * i are Z 2 -linearly dependent. However, by Proposition 4.6 the e * i are statistically close to uniform in Z 2m 2 , and therefore the probability that the e * i are Z 2 -linearly dependent is at most 1/2 2m−k , which is negligible (cf. Lemma A.3). This contradicts the hypothesis that some c i has even denominator with non-negligible probability. It follows that the values {c i mod 2} are well-defined with overwhelming probability. Armed with this fact, we now consider the two types of forgeries and derive a contradiction in each case.
First, suppose that id * was not produced by the simulator during a signature query (type 1 forgery). Since the vectors e i are statistically close to uniform mod 2, their F 2 -span is a random subspace of F 2m 2 of dimension at most k. Because the adversary has no information about the vectors e * i , the probability that e * is in the F 2 -span of the e * i is at most 1/2 2m−k , which is negligible. By our claim above, if e * = c i e * i with c i ∈ Q, then this equation holds mod 2 with overwhelming probability, in which case e * is in the F 2 -span of the e * i . Thus with overwhelming probability we obtain a contradiction to the assumption that e * is a valid type 1 forgery.
On the other hand, suppose that id * was produced by the simulator during a signature query (type 2 forgery). Then since (A U id * ) · e * i = v i mod 2, we have y * = c i v i mod 2. Thus y * is not a valid message for a type 2 forgery, and we have again obtained a contradiction to the assumption that A wins the unforgeability game.
Corollary 5.3. Let N be the linearly homomorphic signature scheme over F 2 described above. Suppose that m = 6n lg 2q , σ = 30 √ n lg 2q log n, and m/k > n. Let β = L · σ · √ 2m, let t > ω( √ log n), and let β = β · (k 3/2 + 1)k!(tσ) k . Then N is unforgeable in the random oracle model assuming that SIS(q, 2m − k, β ) is infeasible. In particular, if k = O(1) and t = log n, then we may take β = O(L · (n lg 2q) k/2+1 (log n) 2k+1 ).
Since the SIS problem is only assumed to be hard for β = poly(n), by Theorem 4.2 our choice of σ forces k to be O(1) to ensure security based on SIS.
Privacy
In our linearly homomorphic signature scheme, one derives a signature on a linear combination v of messages by taking a linear combination of the signatures on the original messages v 1 , . . . , v k . Hence, the derived signature on v is a linear combination of short vectors in cosets of some lattice Λ. To show that this derived signature does not leak information about the original signatures, we use Theorem 4.13 to show that a linear combination of k signatures generated by our signing algorithm is itself a short vector sampled from a distribution that depends only on the function computed and the message v output by the function. In particular, the derived signature does not depend on the original vectors v 1 , . . . , v k (up to negligible statistical distance). It follows that the derived signature does not leak any information about v 1 , . . . , v k beyond what is revealed by v. We note that the length of σ reveals information about the function being computed, but not about the original messages.
The above argument implies that a single derived signature is private; for multiple signatures we use a similar argument with a generalization of Theorem 4.13 given in Theorem 4.14.
Theorem 5.4. Let N be the linearly homomorphic signature scheme over F 2 described in Section 5. Suppose that k < log n 2 log log n , m = 6n lg 2q and σ = 30 √ n lg 2q log n. Then N is weakly context hiding.
Proof. In the privacy game, let (V 0 , V 1 , f 1 , . . . , f s ) be the adversary's output in the challenge phase, where
whose j'th row is v (b) j . We know that
for all i = 1, . . . , s. j be the challenger's signatures (in Z m ) on the basis vectors of V 0 and V 1 , respectively. We arrange these signatures in two matrices
i be a derived signature on u i computed using the Combine algorithm applied to the signatures {e (b) j } 1≤j≤k and the function f i . Again, we arrange these derived signatures in two matrices i is generated from a distribution statistically close to D Λ qv i 2q (B),σ and these signatures are mutually independent. Therefore, by Theorem 4.14 the derived signatures D (0) = F E (0) are statistically close to a distribution parametrized by Λ, σ, F, F V 0 (note that the rows of V 0 describe cosets of Λ so that V 0 plays the same role as the matrix T in Theorem 4.14). Since the same holds for b = 1 and since F V 0 = F V 1 we see that D (0) and D (1) are statistically close. Consequently, even an unbounded adversary cannot win the privacy game with non-negligible advantage.
It remains to argue that σ is sufficiently large to apply Theorem 4.14 to F E (b) , namely that σ > µ(F )η (Λ) for some negligible and where µ(F ) is defined in Theorem 4.14. Since F is a 0/1 matrix it is not difficult to see that µ(F ) ≤ k k ≤ √ n. Moreover, since 2Λ ⊥ q (B) ⊆ Λ, Lemma 3.4 shows that with overwhelming probability η (Λ) ≤ 2η Λ ⊥ q (B) ≤ ω( √ log m) for some negligible . Therefore σ > µ(F )η (Λ) so that Theorem 4.14 can be applied to F E (b) , as required.
k-Time GPV Signatures Without Random Oracles
In this section we give a second application of the k-SIS mechanism described in Section 4, namely, a stateless variant of the the signature scheme of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [18] that is k-time unforgeable in the standard model. The notion of k-time security means that a signing key can only be used to sign k messages. In particular, a forger is allowed at most k signing queries.
The main idea is to construct signatures as in our homomorphic scheme of Section 5, but remove the homomorphic property by setting the bound on the length of a valid signature to be very close to the expected length of the signature. Since we expect a small number of such vectors to form a set that is nearly orthogonal, any linear combination of signatures will produce a vector that is too long to be accepted as a valid signature.
We prove our signature scheme weakly unforgeable; i.e., unforgeable under a static chosen-message attack, in which the adversary must submit all signature queries before seeing the public key. A standard transformation using chameleon hashes [21] produces a scheme that is unforgeable under the usual notion of adaptive chosen-message attack.
We now describe our weakly unforgeable signature scheme, which is essentially a GPV signature in which hashing is replaced with the Chinese remaindering of the message (viewed as a vector in F n 2 ) with the zero vector in Z n q .
Setup(n, params). Given a security parameter n that is also the bit length of messages to be signed, do the following:
1. Choose an odd prime q. Set m ← 6n lg 2q . Set σ ← 30 √ n lg 2q log n. and a basis T of Λ ⊥ 2q (A) such that T ≤ σ/ log n.
3. Output the public key pk ← (A, σ) and the private key sk ← (A, σ, T).
Sign(sk, v). Given secret key sk = (A, σ, T), and a message v (interpreted as a vector in F n 2 ), output e ← SamplePre(A, T, σ, q · v).
Verify(pk, e, v). Given a public key pk = (A, σ), a signature e ∈ Z m , and a message v ∈ F n 2 , output 1 if (a) 0 < e ≤ 1.1 · σ m/2π and (b) A · e = q · v mod 2q. Otherwise output 0.
Correctness of our scheme follows from Proposition 4.7 (with α = 0.1), using Lemma 3.4 to bound the smoothing parameter. In our fully unforgeable scheme, the vector v used in signing is not the message but rather H(M, r), where M is the message, r is random, and H is a chameleon hash function. The signature includes the randomness r in addition to the vector e. For a discussion of lattice-based chameleon hash functions, see [11, §2.2].
Security
An adversary attacking our k-time signature scheme requests k signatures e i on messages of his choice, receives a public key and the signatures, and then outputs a message v * and a signature e * . The adversary wins the game if Verify(pk, e * , v * ) = 1 and v * is not equal to any of the messages queried. We denote the probability of an adversary A winning the game by WeakSig-Adv[A, S].
As was the case for our homomorphic scheme of Section 5, a valid forgery is a short vector e * in Λ ⊥ q (A). The key idea in our security proof is that the length bound on a valid e * is so tight that by Corollary 4.11, the only nonzero integer vectors of comparable length in the Q-span of the requested signatures e i are the vectors ±e i . (Since −e i authenticates the same message as e i , the signature −e i is not a valid forgery.) Thus e * is outside the linear span of the e i , and we can use it to solve the k-SIS instance in which the e i are the challenge vectors.
Theorem 6.1. Let S be the signature scheme described above. Suppose k is constant and β = 1.1·σ m/2π. Then S is a weakly unforgeable k-time signature scheme assuming that k-SIS q,m,β,σ is infeasible.
In particular, let A be a polynomial-time adversary that plays the security game described above. Then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm B that solves k-SIS q,m,β,σ , such that
Proof. We use the same strategy as in the proof of Theorem 5.2. Suppose we are given a k-SIS challenge consisting of a matrix B ∈ Z n×m q and k vectors e * 1 , . . . , e * k ← D Λ ⊥ q (B),σ . Let v 1 , . . . , v k ∈ F n 2 be the messages queried by the adversary A. (If fewer than k messages are queried, we choose random v i to bring the total up to k.) Our algorithm B does the following:
1. Let E be the m × k matrix whose columns are the vectors e * i . If E has F 2 -rank less than k, then abort. (The simulation has failed.) 2. Let V be the n × k matrix whose columns are the vectors v i .
Choose a random matrix
4. Use the Chinese remainder theorem to compute A ∈ Z n×m q such that A = A 2 mod 2 and A = B mod q.
5. Output the public key A and the signatures e * i .
Now suppose that after receiving this information, the adversary A outputs a signature e * on a message v * ∈ F n 2 . Algorithm B outputs e * . By Proposition 4.6, the entries of E are statistically close to uniformly random mod 2. By Lemma A.3, the probability that E has F 2 -rank less than k is bounded above by 1/2 m−k + negl(n). Thus the probability that the simulator aborts is negligible.
We next observe that if the simulator does not abort, the distribution of the simulator's outputs are (statistically) indistinguishable from the distribution of the outputs in the real signature scheme.
• The public key. By Proposition 4.6, the entries of the vectors e * i are statistically close to uniform mod 2. It follows that A 2 is statistically close to uniform mod 2 given the adversary's view, and therefore A is uniformly random in Z n×m 2q .
• The signatures. Observe that the vectors e * i come from the distribution D Λ ⊥ q (A),σ and A is constructed so that e * i ∈ Λ Finally, since the adversary's forgery e * is in Λ qv * 2q (A) and A = B mod q, we have e * ∈ Λ ⊥ q (B). Furthermore, the fact that e * is a valid signature implies 0 < e * ≤ 1.1 · σ m/2π. Since v * ∈ {v i }, we see that e * = ±e i for all i. (Here we use the fact that since the messages are defined mod 2, the signature −e i authenticates the same message as e i .) Corollary 4.11 now shows that with overwhelming probability, e * ∈ Q-span({e 1 , . . . , e k }). It follows that e * is a solution to the k-SIS challenge.
Further Directions
Extending the linearly homomorphic system. While our linearly homomorphic scheme in Section 5 authenticates vectors with coordinates in F 2 , the same construction works for any field F p where p is a small prime. We simply set m = 6n lg pq and σ = 30 √ n lg pq log n, and sign a vector v ∈ F n p using the lattice Λ q·v pq (A). If p is odd and we identify F p with {−(p − 1)/2, . . . , (p − 1)/2}, then the output of Combine on vectors can be up to (p − 1) times as long as the largest input vector. An argument as in Proposition 5.1 shows that the resulting system is L/(p − 1)-limited. We must therefore increase L accordingly to allow for as many linear combinations as in the system over F 2 .
More interestingly, our system can also be used to authenticate vector spaces defined over non-prime fields. Suppose for concreteness that our vectors live in (F 2 d ) n . If we fix a basis for F 2 d over F 2 , then when computing signatures we may view the vectors as elements of (F 2 ) nd and compute signatures in exactly the same manner as above. The difference comes when computing linear combinations over F 2 d : in our representation multiplying an element x ∈ F 2 d by an element α ∈ F 2 d consists of multiplying the corresponding vector x ∈ F d 2 by a matrix M α ∈ F d×d 2 . To compute this action on the signature vector e ∈ Z m , we lift M α to an integer matrix with entries in {0, 1} and group the elements of e into d-tuples corresponding to the underlying elements of F 2 d . Multiplying each d-tuple by M α now has the effect of multiplying the underlying elements of F 2 d by α. We see that this action increases the length of e by a factor of at most d, so combining vectors gives an output that is up to d times as long as the largest input vector. By the same argument as above, the system over
Parameter selection. We now consider how large the parameter q needs to be in order to guarantee security of our signature schemes. We use the result of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [18, Section 9] which gives a reduction of SIS q,m,β to standard worst-case lattice problems. The reduction requires that m and β be polynomial in n and that q ≥ β √ n · ω( log n).
By Corollary 5.3, if k is constant and t = log n, then there is some constant c (depending on k) such that our linearly homomorphic scheme over F 2 is unforgeable whenever
Even if the constant c and the complexity parameter L were equal to 1, for reasonable values of n and k the modulus q must be very large: at least 2 170 for n = 1000 and k = 10. (For our k-time signature scheme the same analysis holds, with the parameter L replaced by the constant 1.1/ √ 2π.)
The requirement that q be large is due entirely to the fact that the reduction from k-SIS to SIS is exponential in k. If a better reduction could be found and/or k-SIS could be reduced directly to worst-case lattice problems in a way that gave a bound on q similar to (7.1), then q/ lg q would grow like L · n 3/2 log 2 n, and we could use values of q in the range of 2 40 .
Open problem. An important open problem inspired by our construction is to find a tight reduction of k-SIS to worst-case lattice problems, either by improving on the reduction to SIS given by Theorem 4.2 or by a direct argument. An improved reduction would support the use of the k-SIS problem in developing cryptosystems for other applications and would also allow us to implement our systems with smaller parameters.
An alternative construction. In recent work [8] , we have developed a different construction of linearly homomorphic signatures over small fields. Unforgeability of the new scheme (in the random oracle model) reduces directly to the SIS problem, without going through the intermediate k-SIS reduction. As a result, the new scheme can authenticate linear combinations of polynomially many vectors, whereas the one in this paper requires the number of vectors combined to be constant. Signatures in the two schemes are of comparable length.
Proof. The first statement is Property (5) of [1, Lemma 12] . For the second statement, we have
It now follows from the first statement that ∆(Y ; Y A ) ≤ 2 , and therefore
Lemma A.2. Let X and Y be two random variables taking values in some countable set Ω. Let c ∈ R be a constant such that ∀a ∈ Ω :
for some function δ satisfying δ(a)
Proof. First, Random matrices over finite fields.
Lemma A.3. Let m, n, q be integers with m > n and q prime. Then the probability that a uniformly random matrix A R ← F n×m q has F q -rank less than n is at most 1/q m−n .
Proof. We view A as a set of n independent vectors v i R ← F m q . The probability that A has less than full rank is bounded above by (see [15, §8.3] ). By Stirling's formula [2, p. 204] we have Γ(z) > z z e −z 2π/z for positive real z. If we let f n (x) denote the right hand side of (A.2), then for any γ > 0 we have f n γ · τ n/2π < 2 1−n/2 n (n−1)/2 γ n−1 e −γ 2 n/2 4π/n · n n/2 2 −n/2 e −n/2 = 1 γ √ π e Next, observe that f n (x) is increasing on (0, τ (n − 1)/2π) and decreasing thereafter. Since for any fixed γ < 1 we have γ ≤ (n − 1)/n for sufficiently large n, it follows that for any γ > 1 and sufficiently large n we have The inequality (A.5) follows from the bound in (A.3). The first term in (A.6) uses the fact that x 2 − 1 − log x is increasing for x > 1, while the second term uses the fact that x 2 − 1 − log x > x for x > 3 (and we eliminate the 1/y in both terms using the fact that γ > 1). Finally, since x 2 − 1 − 2 log x > 0 for any x > 1, both terms in (A.7) are negligible functions of n, proving the upper bound in the Lemma.
B Multivariate Discrete Gaussians
We prove Theorem 4.14. The proof describes explicitly the distribution of AX in the theorem statement. We start with a few definitions needed to describe the distribution. We say that a setΛ ⊆ Z k×m is a multi-lattice it if is closed under addition. From here onΛ is always a multi-lattice in Z k×m and T is a matrix in Z k×m .
• For A ∈ Z s×k define AΛ := {Av for v ∈Λ} ⊆ Z s×m .
• For a symmetric positive-definite matrix Σ ∈ Z k×k , define the function ρ Σ : R k×m → R as
where tr(B) is the trace of the matrix B.
• For a set S ⊆ Z k×m define ρ Σ (S) := v∈S ρ Σ (v).
• Define the distribution DΛ ,Σ,T with supportΛ + T as:
We begin the proof of Theorem 4.14 by first considering matrices A in Z (k−1)×k . We later generalize to arbitrary matrices by induction.
Theorem B.1. LetΛ be a multi-lattice in Z k×m , A ∈ Z (k−1)×k a full rank matrix, T ∈ Z k×m a matrix, and Σ ∈ Z k×k symmetric positive-definite matrix. Let 0 = w ∈ Z k satisfy Aw = 0 and let L be the lattice Plugging this into (B.2) we obtain:
where ρ σ (·) is the standard Gaussian function on R m defined in Section 3. Since σ > η (L), by (3.1) for all v ∈ AΛ + A T we have
for some δ = δ(v) ∈ [0, In what follows we will need the following facts about determinants. For a matrix A in Z s×k and a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} we let A S ∈ Z s×|S| denote the submatrix of A containing all the columns of A indexed by S. 
as required to apply Theorem B.1 to Y and B. This completes the proof of Theorem B.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.14 When A is rank s, Theorem B.3 implies Theorem 4.14. When A has rank less than s, letĀ be a maximal linear independent subset of the rows of A, chosen by scanning top to bottom. The remaining rows of A are linear combinations of the rows ofĀ. Therefore, all of AX can be computed fromĀX. By Theorem B.3, the random variableĀX is parametrized by Λ, σ,Ā, andĀT . Since AX is computable fromĀX, the distribution AX is also parametrized by Λ, σ,Ā, andĀT , as required.
